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Abstract – This contribution focuses on two fundamental features of the African continent that will 
affect both sides of the Mediterranean in the 21
st
 Century. On the one hand, the huge migration 
potential of Africa. On the other, the speed of economic change of a continent increasingly regarded as 
‘the next China’. The challenge facing both the European Union and Africa is to ensure that African 
growth and demography will be sustainable. The paper argues that Europe will be the part of the world 
the most directly affected by developments in Africa, be they the worst random shocks or the most 
virtuous economic trends. It therefore calls for an ambitious renewed EU-Africa economic partnership, 
similar in scope to the Chinese cooperation model in Africa but without imitating it, to avoid a 
migratory haemorrhage and make African development sustainable to the benefit of both sides of the 
Mediterranean.  
 
 
 
In the tormented landscape of Europe’s South-Eastern neighbourhood, punctuated by 
wars and terrorism, not all recent evolutions are negative. At a time when the 
European Union (EU) is struggling with the issue of migrants escaping devastation in 
the Middle-East, certain positive developments are taking place beyond the 
Mediterranean. Once dubbed ‘the forgotten continent’, Africa is no longer exclusively 
associated with endemic poverty, ill governance, conflict, food insecurity and 
epidemics. Its resources in raw materials and rare earth minerals have attracted 
attention of the US, the BRICS, and other non-Western countries such as Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia and Turkey, giving African countries a choice of new partners. 
African economic expansion is far less dependent upon the export of raw materials 
than it used to be.  With many of its economies expanding at a pace above the global 
average, the African continent is now becoming an area of economic growth and 
urbanisation, offering new opportunities for business, and investment. Cross-border 
trade is beginning to grow, and years of institution building are at last paying off in 
terms of strengthening domestic, regional and sub-regional organisations. More than 
half of foreign direct investments (FDI) are now geared towards service industries 
such as telecommunications. Manufacturing industries such as textiles also develop 
rapidly thanks for an abundant workforce leaving the countryside to the large 
metropoles. Finally, Africa has a rising middle class which will boost internal 
consumption. Such trends potentially bear hopes for a renewed North-South 
cooperation across the Mediterranean. 
 
 
Africa: A giant in the making 
 
Africa is indeed a key emerging continent. High growth rates among many African 
economies over the last fifteen years have led to the widespread belief that Africa, 
traditionally the world’s poorest continent, will become ‘the China of the 21st 
Century’, ‘the next Eldorado’, which could one day become the world’s new growth 
engine (Lamy 2013; Baverez 2015). Notwithstanding this, African economies are 
facing numerous challenges. In particular, they need to improve their competitiveness; 
to produce more goods with higher added value; to replace fragmented national 
markets by a wider continental single market; and finally, to create on average 29 
million jobs each year until at least 2030 in order to integrate all young entrants on the 
job market. These challenges are not only a concern for African countries, but they 
also impact upon Europe, at a time when EU-Africa relations are in a state of change. 
How to contribute most effectively to African economic expansion and poverty 
eradication? How to deal with the huge scale of Africa’s migration potential? Does 
the existing Africa-EU Strategic Partnership offer the right framework to reach such 
ambitious aims? These issues are all closely related and cannot be disentangled. In 
this context, characterised by an above average pace of economic expansion, which is 
itself combined with a booming African population and the potential for a rising flux 
of migrants looking towards Europe, three, at first glance unrelated, events took place 
between June and December 2015. These three events call for an urgent re-think of 
the economic, commercial and cultural relationship that the EU entertains with the 
African continent.  
 
 
Regional economic integration and pan-African economic convergence 
 
The first concerns the signing, in June 2015 in Charm-el Cheikh, of a Tripartite Free 
Trade Area (TFTA), which will bring closer together three of the eight regional 
economic communities of Africa: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The 21
st
 Century will be dominated by large 
structures in which states will organise themselves at the level of regions and 
continents and build their foundations on the model of Europe. This is what is now 
taking place in Africa both at regional and at continental level (Onyango and Trouille 
2015b).  
 
Stretching from Alexandria to the Cape of Good Hope, this free trade agreement 
between its 26 member states will represent a population larger than NAFTA or the 
EU. The TFTA could lead towards a pan-African single market, potentially the largest 
of its kind in the world, both in terms of size and population (Onyango and Trouille 
2015c). In a not too distant future, the TFTA might even be the largest market in 
terms of combined GDP: with 5.4 percent yearly non-oil growth on average in sub-
Saharan Africa since the turn of the Millennium
1
, both international business and 
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young African entrepreneurs anticipate rapid further expansion at a time when Europe 
appears to have geared itself to sluggish growth and Asia is struggling to keep its 
momentum. Among the ten countries with the highest level of economic growth in 
2015, five were African economies. Ethiopia, for instance, is ranked by the IMF 
among the five currently most dynamic economies in the world. Out of the six new 
emerging economies (BENIVM
2
) representing together nearly one billion people, two 
are African countries: Nigeria, and Ethiopia, which aims to become the new workshop 
of the world (Daziano 2013). But this trend needs further consolidation to become a 
feature of the new Africa. Reducing border controls and red tape and improving 
infrastructures across the continent have become urging necessities in order for 
Africans to reap more benefits from intra-African trade, which still amounts to less 
than 12 percent of overall African trade with the world, compared with respectively 
70 percent of intra-EU and 55 percent of intra-Asian trades
3
. 
 
Not only has trade been hugely affected by borders, but also the development of 
African industries, which have been deprived of wider market access, and also, as a 
result, of major investment flows. Hence, there is a growing number of local African 
businesses calling for more forceful policy action and improved trade facilitation 
measures to implement the free circulation of the four freedoms. Progress has been 
made at the level of various regional economic communities, however there is often a 
discrepancy between declared good intentions and effective policy implementation 
(Onyango and Trouille 2015a).  These stakes are so crucial for African development 
and entrepreneurship that, as early as 1991, the Abuja Treaty aimed to lift internal 
trade barriers by 2025. Whether the TFTA initiative, which speeds up the process by a 
decade, will really be the ground-breaking leap forward that it ambitions to be, 
remains of course to be seen, as this will largely depend on political will, vision, and 
implementation at various national levels. But the direction that has been taken 
collectively looks encouraging.  
 
 
Migrations: an African as much as a European problem 
 
The second development was the Summit meeting of the EU and the African Union 
(AU) on migrations, held in November 2015 in Malta. The Valletta Summit was 
launched on the initiative of France and Germany after a shipwreck disaster took the 
lives of hundreds of migrants on Libyan shores. The goal was to respond to the 
rapidly growing numbers of migrants by tackling the roots of mass African migration 
to the North and contributing to economic development and job creation in the South. 
Beyond saving lives and controlling migrant flows, the aim was also to address 
concerns among many African countries that their economic ties with Europe could 
suffer collateral damage from the Syrian debacle. Arguably, the summit took place in 
a climate of improvisation, as Europeans’ prime preoccupations were caused by 
increasing flows of migrants from the Middle-East. In this context, it is questionable 
whether the fund of €1.8m offered by the EU is sufficient to create the desired 
economic framework for African migrants to stay in their countries of origin.  
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The EU-AU Summit in Valletta is, admittedly, only one of many European initiatives 
to support financially African development. After the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with 
Caribbean, African and Pacific (ACP) Countries, a joint Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership
4
 was launched in 2007 by 80 European and African Heads of State to 
develop close cooperation, overcome a long-standing donor-recipient relationship and 
provide a framework for joint action in key areas. This large-scale collaborative 
agreement is a useful framework with an ambitious mission statement, which aims at 
promoting political cooperation, peace, security, democracy and human rights, as well 
as trade, regional integration, economic cooperation and sustainable development. 
However, with €1.6bn provided by the EU Commission to the AU since 2003 and a 
similar amount provided to the African Peace Facility since 2004, support remains 
modest in view of the ambitions displayed in the statement.  
 
This leads us to the third significant event that took place last year in Africa. At the 
latest China-Africa Summit, which took place on 4 December 2015 in Johannesburg, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping offered $60bn (€55.3bn) of assistance, loans, credits and 
investments in infrastructure projects, over thirty times more than the fund offered by 
the EU two weeks earlier in Valletta. Admittedly, the EU fund must be considered in 
addition to substantial development assistance, an area where the EU is the most 
generous provider in the world. Europe is also a major provider of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) to African economies and Africa’s first trade partner. Furthermore, 
European sources of funding are multi-faceted as they emanate both from the EU and 
from member states. But notwithstanding this, the size of the Chinese package ought 
to be a wake-up call. It reflects a far-reaching, forward-looking geopolitical ambition 
on the part of China (Michel, S. and Beuret, M. 2010) which is in sharp contrast with 
a certain lack of strategic vision in Europe to address current evolutions on its 
neighbouring continent.   
 
The Valletta Summit led nonetheless to positive outcomes, even though limited ones. 
It reassured the 23 African states represented at the meeting that Europe was still open 
for trade and business; that closer cooperation with Europe will contribute to retaining 
skilled, innovative and entrepreneurial young people in Africa; and that African 
business people and students visiting the EU will continue to obtain visas. 
Furthermore, this summit could, and should, prefigure more ambitious North-South 
cooperation across the Mediterranean. Africa also faces migration problems on a 
similar scale experienced by Europe. Economic migrants to South Africa, Angola or 
Nigeria are just a few examples showing that most African migrations currently take 
place within Africa (Bilak 2016; Flahaut and De Haas 2016). Another example is 
Dadaab, in Kenya, the largest refugee camp worldwide, with a population of 350,000, 
mostly Somalians. Problems of such scale cannot be solved only with EU 
humanitarian aid but call for effective action to boost economic prospects.  
 
 
The demographic ‘time-bomb’: A shared sword of Damocles 
 
Furthermore, the launch of the TFTA and the Malta Summit have to be considered in 
the light of the most recent demographic evolutions in order to fully appraise the 
demographic ‘time-bomb’ potentially threatening both Europe’s welfare and Africa’s 
                                                 
4
 http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf  
economic expansion. To take only one example, Niger, one of the least developed 
countries on earth, counted 3 million inhabitants when it became independent in 1960. 
Today, its population has reached 20 million. On the basis of current trends, it will 
count 36 million by 2030, 72 million by 2050, and 209 million in 2100. But Niger is 
by no means an isolated case. This rapid demographic evolution is characteristic for 
the whole continent, whose population will double by 2050 to reach 2.5 billion, until 
the figure doubles again by 2100. At the same time, the population of the old 
continent, in geographic terms, will shrink from 738 million today to 707 million in 
2050 and 646 million by the end of the Century
5
.  
 
Another striking comparison is provided by the latest report of the European Strategy 
and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) on ‘Global Trends 2030’6, as illustrated in 
Table 1: 
 
 
Table 1: Estimated median age of populations per continent in 2030: 
 
 
Europe 
 
 
44.7 
 
Northern America 
 
 
39.5 
 
Asia 
 
 
35.4 
 
Oceania 
 
 
34.9 
 
Latin America and Caribbean 
 
 
34.1 
 
WORLD AVERAGE 
 
 
33.2 
 
Africa 
 
 
21.3 
 
 
In 15 years, Africa will have the lowest (21.3 years) median age in the world whilst 
Europe will score the highest (44.7 years). Other continents’ figures will stretch 
between Europe and Africa, and the average age across the world will reach 33.2 
years. In other words, Africa’s already young population will become even younger 
whilst Europe’s ageing population will become even older. Demographic explosion 
and over-population in the South will contrast with demographic implosion and 
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relative under-population in the North. In both scenarios, economic growth and 
prosperity, social security, health and social care, education and lifestyles are likely to 
be directly affected.  
 
Should it be deducted from these opposite trends that movements of populations will 
follow the principle of communicating vessels? Is this to say that the recent flux of 
migrants to Europe and more specifically to Germany is only the tip of the iceberg in 
comparison to potential mass migrations from South to North in the next decades? 
The tremendous scale of the African demographic challenge, coupled with the impact 
on fragile populations of armed conflicts, corrupt regimes and climatic changes, are 
fundamental threats for European and African stability alike, despite the fact that 
rapid African economic growth bears at the same time the promise of attractive trade, 
business and investment opportunities. Indeed, 5 percent yearly growth will not be 
sufficient to contain Africa’s exponential demographic curve. Only with a higher level 
of sustained growth will Africa be able to reduce substantially the continent’s extreme 
poverty, which increases the risk of Islamic radicalisation. 
 
 
Fertility rate and education 
 
The more developed an economic area is, the more its demography will adopt certain 
patterns, in terms of its population’s life expectancy and median age, as well as in 
terms of its fertility rate. However, the most important factor that can speed up 
demographic transition and achieve smaller family size is the fertility rate per woman 
in childbearing age. This rate mostly depends upon the level of education of African 
women. In a most recent World Bank report on demographic trends in Africa 
(Canning et al 2015), it clearly appears that African fertility rates will not be 
controlled unless decisive progress is made in educating more women. The case of 
Ethiopia, which counts with 99 million the second largest population of Africa, is 
significant in this respect (see Table 2). In 1960, Ethiopian women in childbearing age 
had a fertility rate of 7 children. This rate only dropped to 5 in 2014. This progress 
was very slow compared to the current 2-3 average in Maghreb countries or Tunisia, 
which is even below 2. However, as Table 2 indicates, the picture is different when 
considering female education levels. The greater the number of years spent in full 
education, the lower the number of children. Ethiopian girls who have attended the 
full 12 years of primary and secondary education have a lower fertility rate than the 
national average of France! Clearly this shows that the education of young women 
impacts substantially upon their contraception. These figures demonstrate the utmost 
importance of education in the African context.  
 
 
Table 2: Level of education versus fertility rate in Ethiopia (2014): 
 
 
Women with no school education 
 
 
6.0 
 
Women with 8 years of school education 
 
 
2.5 
  
Women with full 12 years of school education 
 
1.5 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Both demographic and economic trends in Africa will need to be addressed jointly by 
‘old Europe’ and ‘young Africa’, and at the earliest opportunity, in order to work 
together in making future development in Africa sustainable. Alongside infrastructure 
and agriculture, education is one of the three keys of sustainable development, and it 
is also an area where Europe can make a decisive difference. Almost each of the 54 
African states has a European language as official language. This cultural link 
inherited from colonial times is a great asset for the countries concerned as well as for 
EU-Africa cultural and economic cooperation.  
 
 
Making African development sustainable: A strategic imperative for EU-Africa 
relations 
 
Whilst the large range of EU initiatives and contributions to support Africa go in the 
right direction, they need to be more substantial and coordinated more effectively. 
The EU needs to strengthen its strategic ambition and work on a renewed Euro-
African partnership for co-development whose priority will be to make African 
economic development sustainable, to harness the demographic explosion, and to 
ensure that the new generations will find jobs. Europeans can be certain that they will 
be directly exposed to all consequences, positive as well as negative, of all evolutions 
that will affect Africa in future. The choice for them is therefore to decide at this 
juncture whether they want to shape these major economic, political, social, 
demographic and climatic upheavals that Africa will increasingly have to face. It is in 
the utmost interest of the EU to define a clear vision to anticipate, encourage and 
strengthen African economic expansion to make it more sustainable for the mutual 
benefit of both continents and their societies.  
 
The oldest and the youngest continents will need to work closer together towards 
establishing a North-South axis based on the convergence and complementarity of 
their respective interests. The rise of Africa offers crucial opportunities for Europe as 
an alternative to the shift of economic power from Western economies to the Asia-
Pacific region. Europe will not be able to solve its growth and competitiveness issue, 
face its ageing population and keep a sustainable welfare without tight economic and 
political cooperation with booming economies at its doorstep. The EU remains 
Africa’s largest development aid donor, one of its main trade partners, and its main 
provider of FDI. But Europe needs to use its position as a key economic player to 
establish a forward-looking strategic partnership for co-development. It needs to go 
beyond its traditional role of main development aid donor to contribute more 
effectively to African prosperity, peace and security and create the conditions for 
Africa to build sustainable societies.  
 
 
Last but not least: How to deal with China? 
 
This is a huge task ahead, with multiple obstacles on the way. Whilst Europeans have 
considered Africa for too long as their natural back garden, the rest of the world has 
discovered the potentialities brought about by its recent economic rise. China, in 
particular, has embarked at an early stage into a large-scale economic cooperation 
with most African states and gained paramount economic importance on the black 
continent. Since 2009, China has been Africa’s main trade partner. The EU has to take 
stock of this new context. Should these two protagonists behave like economic and 
geopolitical rivals on the African chessboard (Huliaras 2012)? Or else, should they 
consider forms of tripartite strategic cooperation that could lead to creating a 
favourable framework for sustainable development and generate a win-win situation 
for all three parties concerned? What would be the whys and wherefores of such 
triangular cooperation? Is there complementarity between the EU’s and China’s 
respective comparative advantages? Can these be combined with a view to 
maximising mutual economic benefit among all stakeholders? Should a ‘Euro-
Chinese Marshall Plan’ be envisaged to boost African economic development and 
ensure its sustainability? How could such a grand project work with, on the one hand, 
Europeans with a long experience in dealing with different views and reaching 
consensual agreements between sometimes very diverging positions, but on the other, 
African and Asian partners, many of whom have authoritarian regimes less inclined to 
look beyond their direct interests? From a geopolitical, economic, trade and business 
perspective, the potential benefits of engaging collectively in such a unique triangular 
cooperation could generate positive multiplier effects for all, as long as a balance is 
preserved between boosting trade and investment and promoting development goals 
(Patey 2014). But African governments may be wary of losing their ability to bargain 
between the EU and China, whilst Beijing may prefer to preserve its role as an 
alternative development partner through its distinctive brand of south-south 
cooperation. The challenge will be to convince Africans and Chinese that a tripartite 
approach can be more fruitful than separate geopolitical competition on African soil. 
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